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Abstract 
Hypotheses derived from the lateral attitude change (LAC) model were tested in a study on majority 
and minority influence. The authors predicted that reading majority arguments would lead to explicit 
and implicit focal attitude change as well as LAC (i.e., generalization), whereas reading minority 
arguments would lead to explicit LAC, but not to explicit focal attitude change (i.e., displacement). In 
a 3 (source: majority vs. minority vs. control) x 2 (order of attitude assessments: explicit-implicit vs. 
implicit-explicit) design, students (N = 180) read arguments against an unconditional basic income 
(focal topic) that came from either a majority or a minority, or no arguments (control condition). 
Later, their explicit and implicit attitudes toward the focal topic and four lateral topics (e.g., inclusive 
schooling) were assessed. Individual differences in the need for uniqueness were assessed as a 
potential moderator of majority and minority influence. The results showed focal explicit and implicit 
attitude change in both the majority and minority conditions, but no evidence for LAC. Need for 
uniqueness did not moderate the effects of majority or minority arguments. Potential reasons for the 
lack of evidence for LAC and implications for future research are discussed. 
 
Keywords: displacement; generalization; lateral attitude change; minority influence; need for 
uniqueness 
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Lateral Attitude Change: In Search of Generalization and Displacement Effects  
in Majority and Minority Influence 
Lateral attitude change (LAC) is said to occur when an attempt to change a person's attitude 
toward a focal attitude object shows effects on attitudes toward other, related attitude objects 
(lateral objects). Glaser et al. (2015) have proposed a general theory that conceptualizes LAC in terms 
of an interplay between associative and propositional processes (see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
2006). Specifically, they distinguish two types of LAC, called generalization and displacement. 
Generalization comprises a pattern of explicit and implicit attitude change toward both focal and 
lateral objects, whereas displacement consists of explicit attitude change only toward the lateral 
objects in the absence of any explicit change toward the focal object (cf. Steele & Ostrom, 1974; for 
further discussion, see Linne et al., in press). 
In the current paper, as in some of our previous studies on LAC (Bohner et al., 2020; Linne et 
al., in press), we address hypotheses derived from the LAC model regarding the conditions for 
generalization versus displacement effects. The present experiment was first conceived as part of a 
research proposal on LAC by Glaser and Bohner (2015, p. 11: Experiment 9). It represents a 
conceptual replication and extension of an experiment on majority and minority influence by Alvaro 
and Crano (1997, Study 2). These authors had shown that targets of an influence attempt by an 
ingroup minority often process the minority's arguments but refuse to be influenced by them 
(whereas the same arguments presented by an ingroup majority do cause focal attitude change). 
According to Alvaro and Crano, however, elaborating the minority arguments exerts pressure on the 
cognitive system, and therefore the targets of minority influence will change their attitudes on issues 
that are subtly but not obviously related to the focal issue. For example, when the minority argued 
for stricter gun control laws in the United States of America, recipients changed their attitude on the 
issue of allowing gay men into the US military. Alvaro and Crano's approach thus represents a 
template for studying displacement effects under conditions where participants may be socially 
motivated to reject an influence attempt – because it comes from a minority (Moscovici, 1980). 
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The LAC model states that propositional thinking may either affirm the automatic evaluation 
of a focal attitude object resulting from an influence attempt (the default), which will lead to 
generalization, or reject the automatic evaluation of the focal attitude object, which will lead to 
displacement (Glaser et al., 2015; p. 266: Postulates 1-3). In terms of Alvaro and Crano's (1997) 
approach, affirmation would thus be expected if the influence source is a majority, and displacement 
if the influence source is a minority.  
Going beyond our own previous research, and following Alvaro and Crano (1997), we 
established the relatedness of focal and lateral objects in two ways: (1) by examining lateral objects' 
distance from the focal object in terms of their location in multidimensional semantic space, a 
relatedness that participants are often not consciously aware of, and (2) by examining participants' 
judgments of the likelihood that focal attitude change would cause lateral attitude change. This 
design would allow us to test the LAC model's assumptions about conscious awareness of an 
association between focal and lateral object moderating LAC effects (see Glaser & Bohner, 2015, pp. 
10-11): We predicted displacement effects to be present in particular when the lateral object would 
be close to the focal object in multidimensional semantic space but subjective estimates of focal 
change going along with lateral change would nonetheless be low.  
Because we assumed that indirect minority influence as observed by Alvaro and Crano (1997) 
indeed represents a displacement effect (see Glaser et al., 2015), we closely replicated core aspects 
of their original experiment: We used an ingroup minority or majority as the source of persuasion, 
and we set out to include lateral topics that were associated with the focal topic but not perceived by 
participants to be highly similar in terms of attitude change on one issue causing attitude change on 
the other (see Method section for details). To enable a comprehensive test of the LAC model's 
hypotheses, we extended Alvaro and Crano's design by adding implicit measures of both focal and 
lateral attitudes. As another extension of the original design, we examined an individual-difference 
variable known to moderate effects of majority and minority influence on attitudes. Specifically, we 
predicted stronger effects of majority influence for participants low in the need for uniqueness (NfU; 
LAC IN MAJORITY AND MINORITY INFLUENCE  5 
 
 
 
see Imhoff & Erb, 2009). 
In sum, we hypothesized (H1) that a majority message would cause explicit attitude change 
on the focal topic, whereas a minority message would not cause explicit attitude change on the focal 
topic, (H2) that both a majority message and a minority message would cause implicit attitude 
change on the focal topic, and (H3) that both a majority message and a minority message would 
cause explicit and implicit attitude change on lateral topics. The interaction effect stated in H1 was 
further predicted (H4) to be larger for participants low in NfU. The minority message effects stated in 
H3 were further predicted (H5) to be larger for subtly (but not obviously) related lateral topics. 
Method 
Participants and Design  
Participants (N = 180; 115 female, 64 male, 1 other; Mage = 22.31, SDage = 4.35) were recruited 
on the campus of Bielefeld University. They were randomly assigned to one of the conditions of a 3 
(source: minority vs. majority vs. control condition) x 2 (order of attitude assessments: explicit-
implicit vs. implicit-explicit) between-subjects design and received EUR 2.50 for their participation. 
The order of attitude assessment was counterbalanced to control for potential order effects, without 
any hypotheses attached to that factor. 
Procedure  
Participants were welcomed by an experimenter and seated in front of a desktop computer. 
Instructions stated that the study was part of a Germany-wide investigation of political opinion. To 
ensure a minimal knowledge base regarding the lateral topics, all participants first read short texts 
about these topics, which were introduced as potential topics of interest that might reappear in the 
course of the study. 
Participants in the majority and minority conditions then learned that their task was to rate 
political topics as well as arguments made by previous participants from either Bielefeld University or 
Stuttgart University. Subsequently, participants were told that the specific arguments they would 
rate originated from either a "minority of 20%" or "a majority of 80%" of students at Bielefeld 
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University. By mentioning both ingroup and outgroup sources beforehand, we aimed to ensure that 
all participants would perceive the source as being part of their ingroup. Participants were also told 
that the minority (or majority) was arguing against an unconditional basic income (the focal topic). 
Then participants read five strong arguments against an unconditional basic income. Participants in 
the control condition only received a short informative text about the unconditional basic income 
that was similar to the short texts about the lateral topics. However, they read no arguments against 
the basic income and no information regarding either a minority or a majority. 
Subsequently, implicit and explicit attitudes toward the focal and lateral topics were 
assessed; the order of assessment (explicit-implicit vs. implicit-explicit) was counterbalanced. In line 
with the cover story, participants were also asked to rate the persuasiveness of the arguments as 
part of the explicit attitude survey. 
After the attitude assessments, participants indicated their gender and age, completed a 
manipulation check and a scale measuring NfU. Finally, participants were thanked, debriefed, and 
dismissed. In order to counter any lasting effects of the manipulation, participants also received a 
text containing arguments in favor of an unconditional basic income before leaving the lab.  
Focal and Lateral Topics 
The focal topic, unconditional basic income ("An unconditional basic income should be 
introduced in Germany"), had been evaluated somewhat positively (M = 5.54, SD = 6.42 on a scale 
from 1 = do not agree at all to 9 = completely agree) in a pilot test (N = 140; see Boege et al., 2020, 
Study 3a). This left sufficient leeway for attitude change, because the arguments to be presented 
would be against the unconditional basic income. Based on the same pilot test, four lateral topics 
had been selected that were evaluated as relatively neutral: prolonged primary school ("In Germany 
the transition to secondary school should happen only after 6th grade;" M = 4.91, SD = 5.94), 
inclusive schooling ("Children with mental disabilities should not be in special schools, but in schools 
together with non-disabled children;" M = 5.08, SD = 6.32), online supermarkets ("More 
supermarkets should offer online ordering and delivery of groceries;" M = 5.52, SD = 5.52), and 
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women quota ("There should be women quota at the senior management level of all companies;" 
M = 4.99, SD = 7.44). Following Alvaro and Crano (1997), relatedness of the lateral topics to the focal 
topic had been piloted using two criteria: a lateral object's Euclidian distance to the focal object 
based on multidimensional scaling (MDS) of four semantic-differential ratings, and participants' 
estimated likelihood that someone would change their attitude regarding one object given that they 
had changed their attitude toward the other object1 (for details, see Boege et al., 2020, Studies 3a 
and 3b).  
Unlike Alvaro and Crano (1997), our pilot test did not identify objects that showed high 
similarity regarding the more implicit MDS criterion but truly low similarity regarding the more 
explicit likelihood-estimate criterion. Instead, the topic women quota showed high similarity on both 
criteria, the topics prolonged primary school and online supermarkets showed moderate similarity on 
both criteria, and the topic inclusive schooling showed high similarity on the MDS criterion but 
moderate similarity on the likelihood estimates. Based on our pilot data, therefore, the inclusive 
schooling topic would be most likely to show a pattern of displacement under minority influence (see 
H3) as reported in Alvaro and Crano's research. 
Arguments  
 In order to generate a strong message arguing against an unconditional basic income, twelve 
arguments were generated and separately pilot-tested. Specifically, pilot participants (N = 25) rated 
the persuasiveness of each argument on a scale from 1 = not at all convincing to 9 = absolutely 
convincing. The five arguments that received the highest ratings (all M > 5.24) were selected for the 
main study; an English translation of these arguments is shown in the Appendix. 
Explicit Attitudes  
 Explicit attitudes were assessed by presenting one topic at a time (first the focal topic, then 
                                                            
1 Alvaro and Crano had asked their participants if they would change their own attitude 
regarding one object given that they had changed their attitude toward the other object. We altered 
the wording of items to circumvent self-presentational concerns. 
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the four lateral topics in a randomized order) and asking participants to evaluate each topic on a 
horizontal slider scale with endpoints labeled "negative" and "positive," respectively; responses were 
coded from -100 = most negative to +100 = most positive.2 
Implicit Attitudes  
 The affect misattribution procedure (AMP; Payne et al., 2005; Payne & Lundberg, 2014) was 
used to assess implicit attitudes. Words representing the focal and lateral topics were used as 
primes, each being shown several times shortly before a Chinese symbol that served as the target. 
The word-primes were abbreviations of the attitude topics (e.g., "inclusion" instead of "inclusive 
schooling") that had already been introduced in the materials at the beginning of the experiment. 
Participants were instructed to ignore the words and to focus on the Chinese symbols, quickly 
deciding in each trial whether the target appeared negative or positive to them by pressing the 
appropriate key ("E" for "negative" and "I" for "positive"). In each trial, a fixation cross was shown in 
the center of the screen for 250 ms, and this was followed by the prime for 300 ms; then followed a 
blank screen for 125 ms, which was replaced by the target for 100 ms. The inter-trial interval was 
250 ms. After a short practice phase in which each of two unrelated positive and negative primes was 
displayed twice, the critical prime words were displayed eight times each, resulting in 40 critical 
trials. The proportion of "positive" responses for each prime served as an index of implicit attitude 
toward the respective topic. 
Need for Uniqueness  
 A German version (Schumpe et al., 2016) of the NfU scale (Snyder & Fromkin, 1977) was used 
to assess individual differences in NfU. This scale contains 26 items (e.g., "If I disagree with a superior 
on his or her views, I usually do not keep it to myself"). Participants were asked to rate each item on 
a scale from 1 = do not agree at all to 5 = completely agree. After reverse-scoring where appropriate, 
                                                            
2 In addition, participants were asked to indicate how certain they were concerning their 
attitude toward each topic on a similar slider scale; results concerning these variables will not be 
reported. 
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item scores were averaged into an NfU score (Cronbach's alpha = .79). Participants' NfU scores were 
independent of experimental conditions, as shown by an ANOVA, all p > .33. Thus, low vs. high levels 
of NfU could be used as an independent variable to examine possible influences of NfU on LAC. A 
median split (Mdn = 3.15) yielded a low-NfU group (n = 91) and a high-NfU group (n = 89). 
Manipulation Check  
 Participants in the minority and majority conditions were asked to indicate who was the 
source of the arguments against an unconditional basic income (response options: a majority of 
Bielefeld students / a majority of Stuttgart students / a minority of Bielefeld students / a minority of 
Stuttgart students / I don’t know). 
Results 
Manipulation Check  
 Of the 122 participants in the minority and majority conditions, 87 correctly remembered the 
minority vs. majority status of the source; 35 participants either did not remember the source at all 
(n = 19) or remembered its minority vs. majority status incorrectly (n = 16). Thus, correct recall was 
well above chance levels, χ2(1, N = 122) = 22.16, p < .001, independently of source condition 
(majority: 43 out of 61; minority: 44 out of 61). As the manipulation check was at the end of the 
experiment and a non-reportable influence of the source information on the DVs cannot be ruled 
out, analyses were performed on the whole sample. We note that this is a highly conservative test. 
Nevertheless, significant discrepancies in comparison to a reduced sample will be reported as well. 
Focal Attitude Change 
 A 3x2 ANOVA on explicit focal attitudes with source and order as between-subjects factors 
revealed a significant main effect of source, F(2, 174) = 5.89, p = .003, η² = .063. Table 1 shows that, 
in line with H1, attitudes toward the basic income were more negative in the majority condition than 
in the control condition. However, contrary to H1, focal attitudes were also more negative in the 
minority condition than in the control condition, and the difference between majority and minority 
conditions was not significant for either the whole sample, t(177) = 0.28, p = .782, or the reduced 
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sample, t(142) = 0.61, p = .546. There were no effects involving the order in which attitudes were 
assessed, all p > .26. 
A 3x2 ANOVA on implicit focal attitudes (AMP-scores) revealed significant main effects of the 
source, F(2, 174) = 5.64, p = .004, η² = .061 and of order of attitude assessments, F(1, 174) = 4.40, 
p = .037, η² = .025, as well as a marginal interaction effect of source and order, F(2, 174) = 2.48, 
p = .086, η² = .028. As shown in Table 2, implicit attitudes were more negative in the majority 
condition than in the control condition; they were also more negative in the minority condition than 
in the control condition, and the majority and minority conditions did not differ from each other (see 
Table 3 for significance tests). This suggests, in line with H2, that implicit focal change occurred 
independent of the source condition. Also, theoretically less interesting, in both the minority and the 
control conditions, but not in the majority condition, AMP-scores tended to be more positive when 
they were collected after rather than before the explicit evaluations (see Table 2).  
Overall, then, the data pattern is only partly in line with hypotheses derived from the LAC 
model and does not replicate the results of Alvaro and Crano (1997). Instead, both majority and 
minority messages led to focal attitude change.  
Lateral Attitude Change  
 Although the presence of a significant effect of the minority condition on focal explicit 
attitudes precluded the testing of displacement effects, we did examine the presence of 
generalization effects with 3x2 ANOVAs, first on the averaged explicit evaluations of all four lateral 
topics (overall M = +10.09, SD = 30.06), and on the averaged AMP scores across all four lateral topics 
(overall M = 57.61, SD = 16.68), for the whole and reduced samples, respectively. Contrary to H3, 
none of these ANOVAs yielded any significant effects, all p > .19.  
Additional analyses showed that the four explicit lateral attitudes were not very highly 
intercorrelated (Cronbach's alpha = .16, pairwise correlations between -.09 and +.32), whereas the 
intercorrelations among the four implicit lateral attitudes were somewhat higher (Cronbach's alpha = 
.65, pairwise correlations between +.20 and +.47). This may indicate either that associative 
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connections among the four topics were higher than more consciously attributed similarities, or that 
the AMP scores shared more method-related variance.  
We thus also ran 3x2 ANOVAs on explicit and implicit attitudes toward each individual topic. 
When the whole sample was included, none of these ANOVAs yielded any significant main or 
interaction effects, all p > .13. When only participants who correctly remembered the source were 
included, there were still no main effects of source, but some trends toward interaction effects 
involving the order of attitude assessment emerged. However, these varied in direction across the 
lateral topics and were uninterpretable.  
Overall, then, attitude change was absent in the present experiment for any of the lateral 
topics. This data pattern is not in line with predictions derived from the LAC model (H3 and H5) and 
does not replicate the results of Alvaro and Crano (1997).  
Need for Uniqueness  
 Adding NfU as a dichotomous factor (low vs. high) to the ANOVAs on explicit and implicit 
focal and lateral attitudes yielded a few interaction effects involving the order factor for which we 
have no meaningful interpretation. Apart from that, there was only a marginal main effect of NfU on 
the focal explicit attitude, F(1, 168) = 3,69, p = .056, η² = .021. Participants high in NfU evaluated the 
basic income more positively (M = 11.12, SD = 50.15) than did participants low in NfU (M = -4.47, 
SD = 58.74). Thus, the hypothesis regarding NfU (H4) was not supported. 
Discussion 
Extending an experimental paradigm introduced by Alvaro and Crano (1997), we were 
successful in creating conditions of focal attitude change, both explicit and implicit, under majority 
influence. However, other than in Alvaro and Crano's original study, focal attitude change, both 
explicit and implicit, also emerged in the minority influence condition. Thus, participants who read 
strong arguments against an unconditional basic income generally reported less positive attitudes 
toward this topic, and displayed more negative associations of this topic in the AMP, than did control 
participants who had not received any arguments.  
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The present study thus becomes part of a series of studies that failed to generate the 
necessary preconditions for testing displacement effects, both in our lab (Bohner et al., 2020; Linne 
et al., in press) and elsewhere (Brannon et al., 2019). In our own previous studies, we had attempted 
to produce rejection of a focal influence attempt more directly, for example by instructing 
participants to ignore the stimulus pairings of an evaluative conditioning procedure (Bohner et al., 
2020) or by warning them that valenced information about the focal object was deliberately made up 
(Linne et al., in press). Despite such strong instructions, participants were still influenced by the 
discredited information, and effects on focal attitudes were reduced at best, but did not disappear. 
In the present study, we had hoped that telling participants that arguments came from a minority, a 
more subtle but also more socially meaningful manipulation, would trigger a motive to reject any 
focal influence. In the words of Alvaro and Crano (1997), despite processing the minority message, 
"receivers resist so as to avoid identification with the minority position" (p. 950). However, our data 
showed that this was not the case. Perhaps this may be explained by a cultural difference between 
the USA and Germany: Whereas Alvaro and Crano's participants may have valued their university 
membership as a highly important social identity, which may have motivated them to resist minority 
influence, this may not have been the case for our own Bielefeld University students. Future studies 
on minority influence and LAC may thus benefit from ascertaining the use of more meaningful social 
identities or from screening participants for high ingroup identification.  
Despite the failure of the minority condition to produce focal rejection, the general pattern 
of focal attitude change in both majority and minority conditions as opposed to the control condition 
did allow us to examine generalization effects. Although generalization effects had been found in 
numerous previous studies testing the LAC model (e.g., Brannon et al., 2019; Cruz, 2019; Linne et al., 
in press), there was no evidence for generalization effects in the present study. None of the four 
lateral objects showed any indirect influence of participants' being exposed to either minority or 
majority arguments (and interaction patterns involving the order of attitude assessments were 
erratic). An explanation for this discrepancy in findings may lie in the relative proximity of lateral to 
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focal objects. In the present study, focal-lateral proximity in semantic space was high for some topics, 
but consciously perceived similarity was mostly moderate (except for the women quota topic). By 
contrast, previous studies had shown generalization effects mainly for lateral objects that were high 
in perceived proximity to the focal objects, such as products from the same brand (Linne et al., in 
press) or closely related issues (e.g., recycling and climate change, Cruz, 2019; or antibiotics and 
growth-promoting hormones, Brannon et al., 2019) but had failed to find generalization effects for 
more distantly related objects (e.g., gun control and climate change; Cruz, 2019; or gluten-free diet 
and growth-promoting hormones, Brannon et al., 2019). Thus, the similarities among topics in the 
present study may have been too subtle for LAC to emerge. 
A potentially expedient alternative for examining displacement effects in LAC may be the 
inclusion of individual-difference variables that predispose a recipient toward rejecting social 
influence (see Brannon et al., 2019). In the present study, we had included individual differences in 
NfU based on the assumption that low-NfU recipients would be particularly likely to accept majority 
influence (and reject minority influence; Imhoff & Erb, 2009). However, we only found a theoretically 
uninteresting trend toward a main effect of NfU on focal attitudes that may tentatively be 
interpreted as reflecting a tendency of high NfU going along with a preference for novel or non-
standard political solutions. To conclude, the demonstration of displacement effects in LAC remains 
an elusive endeavor (for further discussion, see Brannon et al., 2019; Linne et al., in press). 
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Table 1 
Explicit Focal Attitudes: Condition Means and Planned Comparisons of Minority and Majority 
Conditions With Control Condition, Separately for the Whole and Reduced Samples 
Sample Source Condition 
 Majority  Minority  Control 
 M (SD) Maj vs. Control M (SD) Min vs. Control M (SD) 
Whole - 8.62 (56.11) t(177) = 3.14** - 5.70 (61.82) t(177) = 2.89** 
+25.12 (56.26) 
Reduced - 10.47 (58.36) t(142) = 2.99** - 2.77 (63.78) t(142) = 2.36* 
Note. Scores shown are on a scale from -100 to +100, with higher scores representing more positive 
attitudes. Maj = Majority, Min = Minority. 
*p < .05, **p < .01.  
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Table 2 
Implicit Focal Attitudes (AMP Scores): Condition Means by Order of Explicit and Implicit Attitude 
Assessment for the Whole and Reduced Samples 
Note. Scores shown are proportions of positive AMP responses. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
aExp - Imp = explicit assessment before implicit assessment; Imp - Exp = implicit assessment before 
explicit assessment. 
 
  
Sample Source Condition and Order of Explicit/Implicit Assessment 
 Majority Minority Control 
 Exp - Impa Imp - Expa Exp - Imp Imp - Exp Exp - Imp    Imp - Exp 
Whole 53.60 (23.49) 50.16 (26.10) 49.77 (22.58) 63.50 (21.55) 
60.19 (22.00) 71.44 (21.27) 
Reduced 50.45 (25.79) 55.71 (24.55) 51.45 (19.44) 67.36 (19.46) 
LAC IN MAJORITY AND MINORITY INFLUENCE  18 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Implicit Focal Attitudes: Planned Comparisons Between Source Conditions for the Whole and the 
Reduced Sample 
Sample Planned Comparison 
 Majority vs. Control Majority vs. Minority Minority vs. Control 
Whole t(177) = 3.17** t(177) = 1.11 t(177) = 2.08* 
Reduced t(177) = 2.72** t(142) = 1.31 t(142) = 1.33 
Note. * p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. 
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Appendix: Arguments Against an Unconditional Basic Income 
 
Argument  Pilot Rating (N = 25) 
 
M SD 
People strive for paid work, both for personal fulfillment and as a basis for 
their own, well-deserved income. 
6.16 1.99 
If children learn that they do not have to achieve anything in order to find 
their way in society, then they will make less effort to acquire a good 
education. Especially in these times, however, high qualifications of entry-
level employees are becoming more important. 
5.64 2.41 
The money used for a basic income must be generated by those who have 
employed work. The basic income is income without performance, which is 
generated from the taxes paid by those citizens who work. It is unfair toward 
those people who work if others who do not want to work are supported at 
their cost. 
5.64 2.33 
An unconditional basic income would be so expensive that in order to pay for 
it other important government spending would have to be cut. (Although a 
basic income looks good at first glance, it would not be worth having, for 
instance, at the cost of reductions in health care.) 
5.40 2.217 
An unconditional basic income would be unfair also because it would not 
take into account how much money a person really needs. This way, tax 
money would be used also to pay a basic income for very rich people. 
5.24 2.15 
Note. Ratings were made on a scale from 1 = not at all convincing to 9 = absolutely convincing. 
 
